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Abstract
We analyze the policy competition between the home and host countries of a multinational ¯rm. Each
country imposes a corporate tax on the ¯rm and chooses its tax base for maximizing national welfare.
We examine two cases. First, we suppose that only the subsidiary of the multinational ¯rm produces
goods; its parent ¯rm does not produce. Second, both the parent and subsidiary ¯rms produce goods.
In the ¯rst case, both the countries do not choose their tax bases, which are less than the pre-tax pro¯t
of the multinational ¯rm. However, in the second case, the home country can choose such a tax base.
Keywords Corporate tax base, Multinational ¯rm, International double taxation relief
JEL Classi¯cation F23, H32, H87
1 Introduction
This paper investigates corporate tax bases that are decided under international policy competition. More
precisely, we suppose that there exists one multinational ¯rm, on which the home and host countries of
the ¯rm impose corporate taxes. We examine the corporate tax bases of both countries when there is
strategic interaction between them. In such a case, international double taxation relief methods play a
crucial role in the decision of both countries. We employ three methods of the relief and account for their
di®erential impact under alternative methods.
The recent corporate tax reforms in developed countries have a tendency to reduce the tax rate and
to broaden the tax base (see Devereux et al., 2002). The literature on corporate tax have explained this
tendency in terms of focusing on two types of behaviors on the part of multinational ¯rms. One such
behavior is pro¯t shifting. Multinational ¯rms obtain higher post-tax pro¯ts by shifting their pre-tax
pro¯ts from a high-tax country to a low-tax one. Since this behavior decreases the tax revenue of the high-
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tax country, countries reduce their tax rates in order to prevent the out°ow of pro¯ts. Accordingly, they
broaden their tax bases in order to cover the reductions of their tax revenues. Hau°er and Schjelderup
(2000) assume that a multinational ¯rm shifts its pro¯t between countries through transfer pricing. They
show that the pro¯t shifting between countries reduces their tax rates, and their tax bases become larger
than the pre-tax pro¯t of the ¯rm in equilibrium. In addition, Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005) suppose
pro¯t shifting through thin capitalization and demonstrate the same result.
The other is the choice of location. Other things being equal, multinational ¯rms choose to locate to
a country that imposes a lower tax burden in order to maximize their post-tax pro¯ts. Since the country
to which the ¯rms locate reaps bene¯ts from them in forms such as tax revenue, each country reduces
its corporate tax rate. Bond (2000) supposes the situation wherein a multinational ¯rm chooses either
foreign direct investment or export for supplying its products to a foreign country. He shows that when
a country imposes a higher tax rate on the multinational ¯rm, the ¯rm selects to export its products.
Since the multinational ¯rm ascribes the transportation costs to the selling price, the country's national
welfare decreases. Hence, each country reduces its tax rate and broadens its tax base in order to cover
the reduction of its tax revenue.1
These studies do not consider the market power of multinational ¯rms. Although the number of the
multinational ¯rms is growing in recent years, it is not considerably large such that their market power
can be ignored. In fact, a small number of ¯rms dominate a market such as the automobile industry and
the energy industry. Thus, we analyze the e®ects of corporate tax on multinational ¯rms in the context of
imperfect competition. Most studies on corporate tax reform do not assume the existence of the ¯rms that
have market power. One exception is Janeba (1996). He assumes a duopoly in which one multinational
¯rm competes against one local ¯rm, and the home and host countries of the multinational ¯rm impose
corporate taxes on the ¯rms for maximizing their national welfare. Then, he primarily analyzes which
tax system is chosen by the home country.
However, his analysis contains two simpli¯cations. First, most of the paper assumes that both coun-
tries choose their corporate tax rates under the exogenously given tax bases, even though he is mainly
concerned with the e®ects of the tax systems on a single industry. Since a corporate tax applies to the
industry as a whole and is imposed at a uniform rate, it can not be adjusted depending on the character-
istics of an individual industry. Thus, it is not appropriate to analyze the tax rates in order to consider
the e®ects on an individual industry. Second, Janeba (1996) does not clearly explain the decision of the
host country.2 He considers strategic interaction between the multinational ¯rm and the local ¯rm, and
1There are some other studies in this ¯eld. For instance, Devereux and Hubbard (2003) studies the e®ects of methods of
double taxation relief on the location choice of multinational ¯rms.
2In this regard, however, he also analyzes the case in which there are multiple industries.
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thus, he cannot explicitly demonstrate the equilibrium outcome because the interaction complicates the
decision of each country.
Therefore, we suppose that each country decides on not the corporate tax rate but tax base. This is
because the corporate tax base can be adjusted depending on the characteristics of an individual industry
such as investment tax credits and depreciation allowances depending on the industry. In addition, we
also assume that only one multinational ¯rm produces goods. By doing so, the competition between
¯rms disappears, and thus, we can show the choice of the host country and the equilibrium outcome.
Accordingly, we employ a model in which the home and host countries of the multinational ¯rm choose
their corporate tax base and the ¯rm decides its output level.
Since both the home and host countries tax the multinational ¯rm, its pro¯t is subject to international
double taxation. Thus, in this paper, we treat three methods of double taxation relief: the exemption
system, the foreign tax credit system and the deduction system. The OECD Double Taxation Convention
advocates the application of the former two methods (see OECD, 1997) and, in fact, most countries
comply with this. We also consider the deduction system since some countries apply this method and
many studies on the double taxation relief from the seminal work of Feldstein and Hartman (1979)
consider it.3
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our model. Section 3 analyzes
the equilibrium tax base and presents two propositions. In Section 4, we extend our basic model and
compare the result with the equilibrium strategy of each country in Section 3. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a monopoly model with one multinational ¯rm and three countries. The multinational
parent ¯rm is located in Country A (home country), and its subsidiary in Country B (host country).
This multinational ¯rm produces goods through only the subsidiary and exports them to the third
country. The parent ¯rm receives pro¯t from the subsidiary; the parent ¯rm itself does not produce.4
The subsidiary's output is denoted by x, its cost function is C(x), and the inverse demand function in
the third country is P (x). Let us make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The inverse demand function P (x) and the cost function C(x) respectively satisfy
3There is a considerable amount of literature on the international double taxation relief methods. See e.g., Hamada (1966),
Bond and Samuelson (1989), Janeba (1995), Fuest and Huber (2002), and Dickescheid (2004).
4We suppose, for instance, that the third country imposes a very high tari® on the imports from Country A. In such a
case, the export of the parent ¯rm is ine±cient. In section 4, we consider the case where the parent ¯rm also produces
homogeneous goods.
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(a) P 0(x) < 0; P 00(x) · 0 and
(b) C 0(x) > 0; C 00(x) > 0.
Country i imposes the following corporate tax, Ti, on the multinational ¯rm.
Ti ´ ti(P (x)x¡ ®iC(x)) i = A;B;
where ti is the tax rate of Country i, and ti 2 (0; 1) is exogenously given in this paper. Each country
decides the tax base, P (x)x¡ ®iC(x), by choosing the parameter ®i. ®iC(x) is the tax-deductible cost.
Thus, we de¯ne ®i as the tax-deductible rate and assume that ®i ¸ 0. When ®i = 1, the corporate
tax of Country i is a pure pro¯t tax. Then, the tax base is equal to the pre-tax pro¯t of the ¯rm and
the taxation does not change its output level. When ®i < 1, the tax-deductible cost is less than the
actual cost, that is, the tax base is larger than the pre-tax pro¯t. This could represent the case with
incomplete deduction of interest payments and/or depreciation expenses.5 Inversely, when ®i > 1, the
tax-deductible cost is more than the actual cost. The tax system with investment tax credits and/or
accelerated depreciation corresponds to this case. We consider the decision of the tax base as the choice
of the tax-deductible rate.6
The subsidiary repatriates the net-of-tax pro¯t to the parent ¯rm, and then, Country A taxes it. The
post-tax pro¯t of the multinational ¯rm depends on not only the corporate tax system of each country
but also international double taxation relief methods. We treat the following three methods:
1. the exemption system (Method E),
2. the foreign tax credit system (Method C), and
3. the deduction system (Method D).
The tax refund in Method j, Rj , is described in Table 1 (j = E;C;D). Under the exemption system,
countries tax the pro¯ts generated by domestic production but not those earned abroad. Thus, Country
A does not tax the repatriated pro¯t, and the tax refund in the exemption system is equal to the corporate
tax in the country (RE = TA). Under the credit system, taxes paid abroad are credited against domestic
taxes unless the foreign tax payments are higher than the domestic. In other words, if TA ¸ TB , then
RC = TB . However, when the foreign tax payments exceed the domestic tax liability, the pro¯t is
exempted from domestic taxation as with the exemption system. Thus, if TA < TB , then RC = TA. We
5For instance, the tax system that does not deduct the opportunity cost of equity capital corresponds to this case.
6In the conventional analysis of corporate tax inspired by the seminal works of Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson
(1967), researchers have an interest in the user cost of capital; they examine how the investment cost should be deducted
in corporate tax systems. Thus, the tax-deductible cost is normally described as the product of the investment cost and
the tax-deductible rate ®i, as in Hau°er and Schjelderup (2000). However, since this paper also investigates the e®ect of
imperfect competition in the market, we substitute the cost function for the investment cost as in Janeba (1996).
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Table 1: International double taxation relief
Tax refund (Rj)
exemption (j = E) tA(P (x)x¡ ®AC(x))
credit (j = C)
8><>: tB(P (x)x¡ ®BC(x)) if TA ¸ TB (Case 1)tA(P (x)x¡ ®AC(x)) if TA < TB (Case 2)
deduction (j = D) tAtB(P (x)x¡ ®BC(x))
label the former case as Case 1, and the latter case Case 2. In Case 1, the output is a®ected by the tax
system of Country A; and in Case 2, by the tax system of Country B. Under the deduction system, the
foreign tax paid is deducted from the domestic corporate tax base.
The multinational ¯rm's pro¯t net of all taxes is given by
¦j = P (x)x¡ C(x)¡ TA ¡ TB +Rj
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(1¡ tB)P (x)x¡ (1¡ tB®B)C(x) j = E;
(1¡ tA)P (x)x¡ (1¡ tA®A)C(x) j = C and TA ¸ TB ;
(1¡ tB)P (x)x¡ (1¡ tB®B)C(x) j = C and TA < TB ;
(1¡ tA)(1¡ tB)P (x)x¡ (1¡ tA®A ¡ tB®B + tAtB®B)C(x) j = D:
(1)
In each method, the multinational ¯rm chooses the output level that maximizes Equation (1).
Country i chooses the tax-deductible rate ®i with the aim of maximizing its national welfare, as
follows.
W jA = (1¡ tB)P (x)¡ (1¡ tB®B)C(x); (2)
W jB = tB(P (x)x¡ ®BC(x)) j = E;C;D; (3)
where W ji denotes the national welfare of Country i in Method j. The national welfare of Country A is
the repatriated pro¯t of the multinational ¯rm. Thus, the corporate tax revenue of Country A does not
appear since the revenue and the tax burden of the ¯rm cancel out on its national welfare. On the other
hand, the national welfare of Country B is its corporate tax revenue.7 ®A does not appear in Equations
(2) and (3), and thus, it does not have a direct e®ect on both countries' national welfare. However, except
for the exemption system, ®A could a®ect the pro¯t of the ¯rm. Accordingly, ®A has an indirect e®ect
on the national welfare of both countries through a change in the output that the ¯rm decides on.
7The national welfare of the third country is consumer surplus.
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We consider a two-stage game: In the ¯rst stage, each country chooses its tax-deductible rate simul-
taneously, and in the second stage, the multinational ¯rm chooses its output.
3 The result
3.1 2nd stage: Multinational ¯rm
First, we consider the pro¯t maximization problem. Since the multinational ¯rm maximizes its post-tax
pro¯t by choosing its output, we obtain the following ¯rst-order conditions.8
¦Ex = (1¡ tB)
·
P 0x+ P ¡
½
1 +
tB(1¡ ®B)
1¡ tB
¾
C 0
¸
= 0; (4a)
¦Cx =
8><>:
(1¡ tA)
h
P 0x+ P ¡
n
1 + tA(1¡®A)1¡tA
o
C 0
i
= 0 if Case 1;
(1¡ tB)
h
P 0x+ P ¡
n
1 + tB(1¡®B)1¡tB
o
C 0
i
= 0 if Case 2;
(4b)
¦Dx = (1¡ tA)(1¡ tB)
·
P 0x+ P ¡
½
1 +
tA(1¡ ®A) + (1¡ tA)tB(1¡ ®B)
(1¡ tA)(1¡ tB)
¾
C 0
¸
= 0; (4c)
where ¦jx (j = E;C;D) denotes the partial derivative of the post-tax pro¯t in Method j with respect to
x. As shown by these conditions, in the exemption system and the credit system of Case 2 (TA < TB),
the output level is a®ected only by the tax system of Country B, whereas in the credit system of Case 1
(TA ¸ TB), it is a®ected only by the tax system of Country A. In the deduction system, both countries'
tax systems could a®ect the output level.
Let us make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. Under all the three methods of double taxation relief, the following two conditions hold.
(a) ¦jxx < 0 and
(b) xj(®A; ®B) > 0 j = E;C;D,
where xj(®A; ®B) denotes the equilibrium output in the second stage.
Assumption 2 ensures that the second-order condition for the interior maximum is satis¯ed.9
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we show the comparative statics of the equilibrium output as follows.
@xj(®A; ®B)
@®A
=
8>><>>:
¡ tAC0(xj)
¦jxx
> 0 if j = D; or C of Case 1;
0 if j = E; or C of Case 2;
(5)
8For notational convenience, the arguments in inverse demand and cost are sometimes omitted.
9When ®i > 1 and ti is su±ciently large, the second derivative condition, Assumption 2-(a), can be violated.
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@xj(®A; ®B)
@®B
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if j = C of Case 1;
¡ tBC0(xj)
¦jxx
> 0 if j = E; or C of Case 2;
¡ tB(1¡tA)C0(xj)
¦jxx
> 0 if j = D:
(6)
If the tax system of Country i a®ects the output of the multinational ¯rm, the equilibrium output
xj(®A; ®B) is an increasing function of the tax-deductible rate ®i. In other words, narrowing the tax
base increases the equilibrium output level.
3.2 1st stage: Country A
Each country maximizes its national welfare by choosing the tax-deductible rate in considering Equations
(5) and (6). Note that since Country A does not tax the pro¯t in the exemption system, we do not consider
the choice of ®A in the method.
3.2.1 The credit system
We classi¯ed the credit system into two cases. Case 1 is TA ¸ TB ; the equilibrium output is a®ected
by the tax system of Country A in this case. On the other hand, Case 2 is TA < TB ; in this case, only
Country B's tax system can a®ect the equilibrium output. We show the ¯rst-order condition for welfare
maximization in each case.
Case 1 (TA ¸ TB) We evaluate Equation (2) at x = xC(®A; ®B) and di®erentiate the equation with
respect to ®A to obtain the ¯rst-order condition. Regardless of the methods of double taxation relief, we
assume the existence of equilibrium in the ¯rst stage.
@WCA
@®A
=
½
(1¡ tB)(1¡ tA®A)¡ (1¡ tA)(1¡ tB®B)
1¡ tA
¾
C 0
@xC
@®A
· 0:
If strict inequality is valid, the national welfare of Country A is maximized at ®A = 0. Otherwise, we
can obtain the following reaction function:
®A = RA(®B) =
tA ¡ tB + tB(1¡ tA)®B
tA(1¡ tB) : (7)
Note that ®A ¸ 0; thus, if the RHS of Equation (7) is negative, the equilibrium tax-deductible rate
®A = 0.
Case 2 (TA < TB) In this case, the tax system of Country A does not a®ect the output. Thus,
national welfare is not a®ected by ®A, and we are unable to obtain the equilibrium tax-deductible rate
of Country A in Case 2.
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3.2.2 The deduction system
Country A chooses ®A = 1 independent of the Country B's tax-deductible rate ®B since the ¯rst-order
condition for welfare maximization is as follows.
@WDA
@®A
=
½
tA(1¡ ®A)C 0
1¡ tA
¾
@xD
@®A
= 0:
3.3 1st stage: Country B
3.3.1 The exemption system
Since Country A does not tax the pro¯t of the multinational ¯rm, only the tax system of Country B
can a®ect the equilibrium outcome. We evaluate Equation (3) at x = xE(®A; ®B) and di®erentiate the
equation with respect to ®B to obtain the ¯rst-order condition.
@WEB
@®B
=
½
tB(1¡ ®B)C 0
1¡ tB
¾
@xE
@®B
¡ tBC = ¡tB
½
tB(1¡ ®B)(C 0)2
(1¡ tB)¦Exx
+ C
¾
· 0: (8)
If strict inequality is valid, the national welfare of Country B is maximized at ®B = 0. Otherwise, the
condition for welfare maximization is expressed by
®B = 1 +
(1¡ tB)C¦Exx
tB(C 0)2
< 1:
Therefore, the equilibrium value of ®B is less than 1. This is explained as follows: When ®B = 1, the
tax base is neutral with respect to the ¯rm's choice of output and the output level chosen is equal to
the no-tax case. Then, the pre-tax pro¯t is maximized. If Country B raises ®B from 1, its tax revenue
decreases because of the reduction in the pre-tax pro¯t and the tax base. On the other hand, by reducing
®B slightly from 1, the tax revenue increases because it can broaden the tax base without a®ecting the
pre-tax pro¯t. Thus, the equilibrium tax-deductible rate of Country B is less than 1. In other words,
Country B chooses a broad tax base as compared to the pre-tax pro¯t.
3.3.2 The credit system
Case 1 (TA ¸ TB) The ¯rst-order condition for welfare maximization is given by
@WCB
@®B
= tB
½
1¡ tA®A ¡ ®B(1¡ tA)
1¡ tA
¾
@xC
@®B
¡ tBC = ¡tBC < 0:
Since the choice of ®B does not a®ect the output level, Country B chooses the broadest tax base possible.
Thus, ®B is minimized within TA ¸ TB .
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Case 2 (TA < TB) Since only the tax system of Country B can a®ect the quantity choice of the
multinational ¯rm, the ¯rst-order condition is equal to Equation (8). Note that if ®B is su±ciently large,
TB becomes less than TA. Hence, ®B is limited to a ceiling.10
3.3.3 The deduction system
The ¯rst-order condition is as follows.
@WDB
@®B
= tB
½
1¡ tA®A ¡ ®B(1¡ tA)
1¡ tA
¾
@xD
@®B
¡ tBC = ¡tB
·f1¡ ®B ¡ tA(®A ¡ ®B)g(C 0)2
(1¡ tB)¦Dxx
+ C
¸
· 0:
If strict inequality is valid, the national welfare of Country B is maximized at ®B = 0. Otherwise, we
can obtain the following condition.
®B =
(1¡ tA®A)(C 0)2 + (1¡ tB)C¦Dxx
(1¡ tA)(C 0)2 :
3.4 Equilibrium
Using the above conditions, we obtain the tax-deductible rates of both countries in equilibrium. In this
subsection, we specify the inverse demand function and the cost function as follows:11
Assumption 3. The inverse demand function P (x) is linear, and the cost function C(x) is quadratic.
They are expressed as follows.
(a) P (x) = a¡ x and
(b) C(x) = x2,
where a > 0.
3.4.1 The exemption system
By Assumption 3, the equilibrium output is given by
xE =
a(1¡ tB)
2(2¡ tB ¡ tB®B) :
Evaluating Equation (3) at this value of x, we can obtain the equilibrium tax-deductible rate of Country
B in the exemption system.
®EB = ¡
2¡ 5tB + t2B
tB(1 + tB)
: (9)
10Since each country maximizes its national welfare, they desire to realize the case that yields a higher level of welfare.
We need to consider which case is realized. However, thus far, we do not obtain su±cient conditions to do it. Thus, we
analyze it based on an additional assumption in Subsection 3.4.
11The speci¯cation in Assumption 3 satis¯es Assumption 1.
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We describe the equilibrium tax-deductible rate of Country i in Method j as ®ji (i = A;B; j = E;C;D).
If the tax rate of Country B is su±ciently small (tB · (5 ¡
p
17)=2), the RHS of Equation (9) is
negative, and then, the equilibrium tax-deductible rate is zero (®EB = 0). The equilibrium national
welfare (WEA ;W
E
B ) is as follows.
(WEA ;W
E
B ) =
8><>:
³
a2(1¡tB)(1+tB)
16 ;
a2(1+tB)
2
32
´
if tB > 5¡
p
17
2 ;³
a2(1¡tB)2
4(2¡tB) ;
a2tB(1¡tB)(3¡tB)
4(2¡tB)2
´
otherwise:
3.4.2 The credit system
Case 1 (TA ¸ TB) The equilibrium output is
xC =
a(1¡ tA)
2(2¡ tA ¡ tA®A) ;
and the reaction function of Country A is given by
®A = RA(®B) =
tA ¡ tB + tB(1¡ tA)®B
tA(1¡ tB) :
This is equal to Equation (7). On the other hand, Country B chooses the smallest tax-deductible rate
possible, and thus, ®B = 0. Since the country wishes to choose this rate for any tA 2 (0; 1), if tA < tB ,
Case 1 is not realized (Case 2 is realized). Hence, when tA < tB , there is no equilibrium in Case 1.
Each country chooses the following tax-deductible rate in Case 1.
(®A; ®B) =
µ
tA ¡ tB
tA(1¡ tB) ; 0
¶
if tA ¸ tB ; (10)
and the national welfare of both countries is as follows.
(WA;WB) =
µ
a2(1¡ tB)2
4(2¡ tB) ;
a2tB(1¡ tB)(3¡ tB)
4(2¡ tB)2
¶
: (11)
Case 2 (TA < TB) Since only the tax system of Country B has an e®ect on the output of the
multinational ¯rm, Case 2 is identical to the exemption system except for the constraint TA < TB . Thus,
the tax-deductible rate that Country B chooses is given by
®B = ¡2¡ 5tB + t
2
B
tB(1 + tB)
: (12)
Note that when the tax rate of Country B is su±ciently small (tB · (5¡
p
17)=2), ®B = 0. The national
welfare of both countries (WA;WB) are as follows.
(WA;WB) =
8><>:
³
a2(1¡tB)(1+tB)
16 ;
a2(1+tB)
2
32
´
if tB > 5¡
p
17
2 ;³
a2(1¡tB)2
4(2¡tB) ;
a2tB(1¡tB)(3¡tB)
4(2¡tB)2
´
otherwise:
(13)
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Finally, we consider the selection between the two cases. For instance, in Case 1, if Country A can
obtain a higher national welfare than that shown in Equation (11) by raising ®A to such an extent that
Case 2 is realized, then the above result in Case 1 is not the equilibrium in the credit system. Thus, we
need to consider the incentives for both countries to deviate from the strategy as described above.
First, we examine the incentives for the two countries to deviate from Case 1. In this case, since
Country B already chooses ®B = 0, it cannot deviate by reducing ®B . Hence, we consider only the
incentive for Country A that might deviate from Case 1 by raising ®A. However, if the country raises ®A
to such an extent that Case 2 is realized, its welfare level does not improve strictly. Therefore, Equations
(10) and (11) show the tax-deductible rates and the national welfare in equilibrium.
Second, we analyze the incentives to deviate from Case 2. Note that, in Case 2, Country A does not
choose ®A since the choice does not a®ect its national welfare. Thus, it is not clear whether Case 1 is
realized or not when ®B takes a certain value. Accordingly, we assume that Country B does not have
the incentive to deviate from Case 2. On the other hand, we can investigate the incentive for Country
A. If Country A chooses a su±ciently low ®A to such an extent that Case 1 is realized, its welfare level
does not improve strictly. Therefore, Equations (12) and (13) also show the tax-deductible rate and the
national welfare in equilibrium.
3.4.3 The deduction system
The equilibrium output in this method is given by
xD =
a(1¡ tA)(1¡ tB)
2(2¡ tA ¡ tB + tAtB ¡ tA®A ¡ tB®B + tAtB®B) :
The reaction functions of both the countries are as follows.
®A = RA(®B) = 1;
®B = RB(®A) = ¡2¡ tA ¡ 5tB + 2tAtB + t
2
B ¡ tAt2B ¡ tA®A + 3tAtB®A
tB(1¡ tA)(1 + tB) :
Therefore, we obtain the following equilibrium outcomes.
(®DA ; ®
D
B ) =
8><>:
³
1; ¡ 2¡5tB+t2BtB(1+tB)
´
if tB > 5¡
p
17
2 ;
(1; 0) otherwise;
(14)
(WDA ;W
D
B ) =
8><>:
³
a2(1¡tB)(1+tB)
16 ;
a2(1+tB)
2
32
´
if tB > 5¡
p
17
2 ;³
a2(1¡tB)2
4(2¡tB) ;
a2tB(1¡tB)(3¡tB)
4(2¡tB)2
´
otherwise:
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3.5 Proposition
We obtain two propositions by comparing the three methods of double taxation relief.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the tax-deductible rate in equilibrium is ®i · 1 (i = A;B)
independent of the methods of double taxation relief. However, the tax-deductible rate of Country A in
the credit system of Case 2 is not decided.
First, we consider Country B. The national welfare of the country is the corporate tax revenue,
and thus it maximizes the tax revenue. We explain the intuition behind Proposition 1 by dividing the
e®ect, namely, the e®ect of an alteration of the tax-deductible rate ®B on national welfare, into direct
and indirect e®ects. The direct e®ect is that the alteration changes the tax revenue under the constant
pre-tax pro¯t of the multinational ¯rm. For instance, the reduction of ®B (viz. the broadening of the tax
base) always increases the tax revenue of Country B in the direct e®ect. The indirect e®ect is that the
alteration changes the tax revenue through the change in the output and the pre-tax pro¯t. Unlike the
direct e®ect, the reduction of ®B does not always increase the tax revenue. It is dependent on the value
of ®B , irrespective of whether the tax revenue increases or decreases in the indirect e®ect. When ®B is
larger than 1, the equilibrium output level is excessive as compared to the no-tax case since the cost is
deducted from the tax base excessively. Thus, the reduction of ®B decreases the output and increases
the pre-tax pro¯t and the tax revenue. Inversely, when ®B is less than 1, the reduction of ®B decreases
the pre-tax pro¯t and tax revenue. To sum up, when Country B changes the tax-deductible rate from
®B = 1, the indirect e®ect turns into the tax revenue reduction e®ect.
Considering the direct and indirect e®ects, we can understand why Country B chooses ®B < 1. At
®B = 1, the marginal reduction in ®B increases the tax revenue by the direct e®ect while the indirect e®ect
does not work. Thus, the corporate tax revenue of Country B increases by choosing the tax-deductible
rate less than 1. As concerns in the deduction system, we cannot explain Proposition 1 by the above two
e®ects because the tax-deductible rate of Country A also a®ects the decision of the multinational ¯rm.
However, in equilibrium, Country A chooses ®A = 1, and then the tax system of the country does a®ect
the decision-making of the multinational ¯rm. Therefore, the result is the same as that in the exemption
system and the credit system.
On the other hand, the national welfare of Country A is the repatriated pro¯t of the multinational
¯rm. As stated in Section 2, the tax-deductible rate of Country A does not directly a®ect its national
welfare, and thus, the country chooses ®A in consideration of the indirect e®ect through the change in
the output and the pre-tax pro¯t. Since this indirect e®ect depends on the the tax system of both the
countries, it is di±cult to explain Proposition 1 by this e®ect. Therefore, we describe it as follows: In
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all the methods, Country B decides the tax base, which is larger than the pre-tax pro¯t of the ¯rm. If
Country A raises ®A, Country B obtains most of the tax revenue from the incremental pro¯t, and the
national welfare of Country A does not improve. Therefore, Country A does not choose ®A > 1.
Proposition 1 can also be proved by Assumption 1 instead of Assumption 3. Thus, this proposition is
robust against the speci¯cation of functions. Meanwhile, we can compare the output and national welfare
in each method by specifying the functions. As a result, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the equilibrium output and the equilibrium national welfare
of both countries in each method of double taxation relief are as follows.
xE = xC2 = xD ¸ xC1:
WEi =W
C2
i =W
D
i ¸WC1i ;
where xCj and WCji (i = A;B; j = 1; 2) denote the equilibrium output and equilibrium national welfare
in the credit system of Case j. The strict inequality is valid only if tB > (5¡
p
17)=2.
If an equilibrium exists in the credit system of Case 2, the outcome coincides with that in the exemption
system. Moreover, in the deduction system, the equilibrium outcome coincides with it since Country A
chooses ®A = 1 in equilibrium. However, in the credit system of Case 1, the level of national welfare
in each country is less than that in the case of the other methods, provided tB > (5 ¡
p
17)=2. In this
case, the tax system of Country B does not a®ect the decision of the multinational ¯rm, and the country
chooses a broad tax base (®CB = 0) as compared with the others. Since this choice of Country B reduces
the tax-deductible rate of Country A, the pre-tax pro¯t in this case is lower than that in the others.12
Note that if tB is su±ciently small (tB · (5 ¡
p
17)=2), the national welfare of each method becomes
equal.
By Proposition 2, the total welfare of the both countries in the credit system of Case 1 is the lowest
in the methods of double taxation relief. In addition, since the same applies to the output, world welfare
which is the sum of the national welfare of the three countries takes the same order as the individual
national welfare.
These two propositions have two features. One is that the credit system could be undesirable for
the three countries (the home, the host, and the third country). This is because Country B does not
deduct the ¯rm's cost from the tax base in Case 1 (®B = 0). In this case, since the host country tax
does not a®ect the output level, the expansion of the tax base always increases its tax revenue (only the
direct e®ect is active). Therefore, the tax-deductible rate of Country A falls and the pre-tax pro¯t of the
multinational ¯rm decreases.
12As expressed in Equation (7), ®A is the increasing function of ®B .
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The other feature is that the equilibrium tax-deductible rate is less than or equal to 1 and in the
deduction system, ®A is equal to 1. We can provide a rough explanation of ®DA = 1 as follows: Comparing
the national welfare of Country A in the exemption system, in which only the tax system of Country B
a®ects the decision of the multinational ¯rm, with that in the credit system of Case 1, in which only the
tax system of Country A a®ects the decision, the welfare in the exemption system is higher. Therefore,
Country A chooses ®A = 1 such that its tax system does not a®ect the decision of the ¯rm.
Thus far, we have considered the decision of the tax-deductible rate based on the model as described
in Section 2. In the model, the tax base of Country A is not decided in the exemption and credit system
of Case 2. This is because the ¯rm that makes a pro¯t in Country A does not exist. Accordingly, in
the next section, we suppose that the parent ¯rm that locates to Country A also produces homogeneous
goods and exports them to the third country.
4 The production in the parent and subsidiary
The aim of this section is to examine the e®ect that the production activities of the parent ¯rm have
on the tax-deductible rates in the exemption system. In the previous model, Country A does not tax
the multinational ¯rm in the exemption system since the parent ¯rm does not generate pro¯ts by itself.
Thus, we consider the tax-deductible rate of Country A when the parent ¯rm also produces homogeneous
goods, and examine the e®ect of the production activities on the strategy of Country B. Let y denote
the output of the parent ¯rm; further, we assume that the cost function of the ¯rm is identical to that of
the subsidiary. The total pro¯t of the multinational ¯rm e¦E and the national welfare of both countriesfWEA and fWEB are expressed by
e¦E = (1¡ tA)P (x+ y)y ¡ (1¡ tA®A)C(y) + (1¡ tB)P (x+ y)x¡ (1¡ tB®B)C(x);
fWEA = P (x+ y)y ¡ C(y) + (1¡ tB)P (x+ y)x¡ (1¡ tB®B)C(x);fWEB = tB(P (x+ y)x¡ ®BC(x)):
The multinational ¯rm decides x and y in order to maximize its post-tax pro¯t. At this point, we assume
su±cient conditions for the existence of equilibrium in the second stage.
Assumption 4. The pro¯t function e¦E is twice di®erentiable and it satis¯es the following conditions.
(a) e¦Exx < 0, e¦Eyy < 0,
(b) ¢ ´ e¦Exxe¦Eyy ¡ (e¦Exy)2 > 0, and
(c) ~xE(®A; ®B) > 0 and ~yE(®A; ®B) > 0.
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where ~xE(®A; ®B) and ~yE(®A; ®B) denote the equilibrium outputs of the parent ¯rm and the subsidiary
in the second stage, respectively.
Under Assumptions 1 and 4, we show the comparative statics of the equilibrium outputs as follows.8><>:
@~xE
@®A
= tAC
0(~yE)¡
¢ < 0;
@~yE
@®A
= ¡ tAC0(~yE)e¦Exx¢ > 0;
@~xE
@®B
= ¡ tBC
0(~xE)e¦Eyy
¢ > 0;
@~yE
@®B
= tBC
0(~xE)¡
¢ < 0;
(15)
where ¡ ´ (1¡ tA)(P 00~yE + P 0) + (1¡ tB)(P 00~xE + P 0) < 0:
The equilibrium output of the production base located in Country i is an increasing function of ®i but
it is a decreasing function of ®j (i; j = A;B; j 6= i). For instance, if Country A raises ®A, then the
equilibrium output of the parent ~yE increases but that of the subsidiary ~xE decreases. Intuitively, the
post-tax cost of the parent is reduced by raising ®A, and thus, its output increases. The increase of the
total output lowers the market price and decreases the pro¯t of the subsidiary. Then, the subsidiary has
an incentive to raise the market price by reducing the output. That is, the multinational ¯rm adjusts
the production share within the ¯rm.
We obtain the ¯rst-order conditions for the welfare maximization of Country A and Country B. The
condition of Country A is given by
@fWEA
@®A
= tAP 0~yE
@~xE
@®A
¡
½
tA(1¡ tB)P 0~xE
1¡ tA
¾
@~yE
@®A
+
½
tA(1¡ ®A)C 0(~yE)
1¡ tA
¾
@~yE
@®A
= 0:
By Assumption 1 and Equation (15), the ¯rst two terms are positive. Therefore, this condition can be
satis¯ed by choosing ®A > 1 such that the third term becomes negative.
On the other hand, we cannot obtain the optimal decision of Country B because the ¯rst-order
condition of this country is
@fWEB
@®B
=
½
tB(1¡ ®B)C 0(~xE)
1¡ tB
¾
@~xE
@®B
¡ tBC(~xE)¡
½
tB(1¡ tA)P 0~yE
1¡ tB
¾
@~xE
@®B
+ tBP 0~xE
@~yE
@®B
= 0;
and thus, there are two factors that determine the value of ®B . One of them is represented by the ¯rst
two terms. This factor has already appeared in the previous model as well. Roughly speaking, the ¯rst
term is the indirect e®ect and the second is the direct e®ect as stated in Subsection 3.5. In addition,
another factor exists in the above condition. This is represented by the last two terms. These show
the e®ects that the tax-deductible rate of Country B has on the adjustment of the multinational ¯rm's
production share. With respect to latter factor, the rise of ®B improves the national welfare of Country
B; however, in the former factor, it does not necessarily improve the welfare. In particular, when ®B > 1,
it decreases the welfare. Therefore, we cannot obtain the optimal decision of Country B.13
13If we specify the inverse demand and cost functions as per Assumption 3, we could obtain the reaction function of Country
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In contrast to Proposition 1, Country A chooses ®A > 1. Each country can raise the production
share of the ¯rm located in the country by raising its tax-deductible rate. Since the pro¯t of the ¯rm
increases due to the rise in the share, each country has an incentive to raise its tax-deductible rate. In
individual terms, the pro¯t of the parent ¯rm is not taxed in Country B, and thus, Country A raises
its tax-deductible rate to increase the share of the parent. On the other hand, Country B can tax only
the pro¯t of the subsidiary. Thus, it raises ®B to increase the share of the subsidiary. However, since
Country B also has an incentive to decrease its tax-deductible rate for maximizing the tax revenue, we
cannot clarify its optimal decision. This tax-deductible rate that raises incentives also exists in the other
methods of double taxation relief.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the policy competition between two countries, in which each country chooses its
corporate tax base for maximizing its national welfare. We supposed that one multinational ¯rm operates
in both the countries and examined two cases. One is the case where only its subsidiary, which is located
in the host country, produces goods, and the other is the case where the multinational parent ¯rm also
produces. In the former case, each country chooses the tax base that is larger than or equal to the pre-tax
pro¯t of the multinational ¯rm independent of the methods of double taxation relief. In the latter case,
each country has an additional incentive to narrow its tax base. In the exemption system, in particular,
the home country chooses the tax base that is less than the pre-tax pro¯t of the multinational parent.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on corporate tax in the following two respects. First, we
have incorporated the strategic choice of the tax base into the analysis of corporate tax. Most of the
literature on international taxation considers tax rate competition but are not concerned with tax base
competition. Since we attended to the e®ects of corporate taxes on the individual industry, it is desirable
to focus on the tax base, as stated in Introduction.
Second, this paper has shown that the corporate tax bases of both countries are larger than the pre-
tax pro¯t of the multinational ¯rm. This is particularly observed in the host country because it has a
strong incentive to raise its tax revenue as compared with the home country. Note that when the parent
also produces homogeneous goods, this outcome is not realized due to the factor of production share
adjustment, as explained in Section 4. Thus, the strategic choice of corporate tax base might not explain
the fact that many countries broaden their tax bases. However, in developed countries, the cross-hauling
B. However, since the ¯rst-order conditions of both countries are more complicated than that in the previous model, we
are unable to obtain an equilibrium.
16
direct investment has been observed. In such a case, both countries have an incentive to increase their
own tax revenues from foreign ¯rms. Therefore, both countries could choose broader corporate tax bases.
The analysis of this case is a subject for future research.14
This paper intends to investigate the corporate tax base, which is decided in the policy competition
between the home and host countries of the multinational ¯rm. As stated above, this viewpoint has been
almost ignored in the existing literature. However, researchers in the debate on corporate tax reform
| which has proposed some alternatives to the current system such as an Allowance for Corporate
Equity (ACE), cash-°ow tax, and Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) | are concerned with
the corporate tax base. This paper presented a methodology to ¯ll in the gap.15 Note, however, that our
analysis merely focused on foreign direct investment, which is an approach of the foreign market entry of
multinational ¯rms. There are some alternatives such as export and licensing. Therefore, in the future,
we need to classify these approaches and examine the e®ects of the corporate tax systems on the behavior
of multinational ¯rms.
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